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Several Supreme Court cases in the latter half of the 20th Century established a 
criminal defendant’s due process right to put forward an effective defense. To put forward 
an effective defense, one must be able to introduce exculpatory evidence on one’s behalf. 
A defendant’s witness may claim the right against self-incrimination, in which case 
the defendant may request immunity for the witness so that he will testify. If that request is 
denied, a defendant’s due process right to put forward an effective defense may be 
implicated. The refusal to grant defense witness immunity is one instance of suppression of 
evidence. In a string of cases in the Third Circuit, the courts have implemented a test for 
determining under what conditions a due process violation occurs in this situation. But, 
there is significant reason to believe that in implementing the test the court has relied on 
incorrect assumptions.  
This paper discusses how the court has relied on unwarranted assumptions to make 
due process determinations, and concludes that in so doing it has imposed too high a 
 vii 
standard for a due process violation. First, the court interprets the test as a test for a due 
process violation, when there is reason to believe that the court articulating the test meant it 
to be a test for the appropriateness of judicially created immunity as the remedy for an 
existing due process violation. Second, the court makes an unwarranted assumption that any 
strong governmental interest countervails against a grant of witness immunity. Third, the 
court imposes too high a standard for determining what counts as a strong governmental 
interest because it does not give sufficient weight the context of the determination. These 
three unwarranted assumptions suggest that the court has imposed too high a standard for 
determining due process violations.  
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Right to an Effective Defense 
In Roviaro v. United States1, a government informant, John Doe, was the sole material 
witness to Roviaro’s alleged illegal transportation of heroine. Upon request, the Government 
refused to disclose the identity of John Doe by invoking its privilege to withhold the identity 
of government informants. Roviaro was only able to cross-examine government witnesses 
who had spoken with Doe, but not Doe himself. The court held that the Government’s 
refusal to disclose Doe’s identity was reversible error. “Where the disclosure of an informer’s 
identity, or the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an 
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.”2 In 
this case, because Doe was the only one with Roviaro at the time he allegedly committed the 
crime, “Doe’s possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the 
defense.”3 In holding that the government had erred by refusing to allow Roviaro to 
confront Doe, it vindicated his due process right to put forward an effective defense. The 
court remanded the case to the district court.  
In Brady v. Maryland4, petitioner Brady and an accomplice, Boblit, were convicted of 
first degree murder and sentenced to death. Brady’s counsel requested from the prosecution 
any statements made by Boblit out of court. The prosecution withheld one of those 
statements, in which Boblit confessed to the actual killing. The Court of Appeals held, and 
the Supreme Court affirmed, that the prosecution’s refusal to disclose Boblit’s statement was 
a violation of Brady’s due process right. The court held that “the suppression by the 
                                                
1 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) 
2 Roviaro, supra note 1, at 628 
3 Id, at 629 
4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) 
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prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution.”5 The court’s holding does not require that the prosecutor act 
willfully to distort the fact-finding process in order for the failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to constitute a due process violation. 
In Chambers v. Mississippi6, Chambers appealed a conviction of murder. Before 
Chambers’ trial, McDonald had made a written confession of the murder, as well as oral 
confessions to friends, but had repudiated his statement. Because of a Mississippi rule 
preventing criminal defendants from cross-examining their own witnesses as adverse, and 
because the trial court found that McDonald was not “adverse” in the technical sense 
required, the court denied Chambers’ motion to cross-examine McDonald as an adverse 
witness. The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s refusal to allow Chambers to present 
McDonald as an adverse witness was a constitutional violation. “Few rights are more 
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.”7 The case was 
remanded.  
Just because the right to present witnesses in one’s defense is a fundamental right, 
however, does not entail that there is a due process violation any time a criminal defendant is 
prevented from doing so. The court in Chambers includes the caveat that one is not always 
entitled to cross-examine a witness: “the right to confront and to cross-examine is not 
absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the 
                                                
5 Id, at 87  
6 Chambers v. Mississippi., 410 U.S. 284 (1973) 
7 Id, at 312 
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criminal trial process.”8 In its discussion of Chambers, the Third Circuit in United States v. 
Herman9 writes “we find hints of a due process right to have clearly exculpatory evidence 
presented to the jury, at least when there is no strong countervailing systemic interest that 
justifies its exclusion.”10 
 The Court uses similar language in Roviaro. There, the court did not find that the 
Government’s refusal to disclose its informant’s identity was per se reversible error. Rather,  
“[t]he problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting 
the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. 
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on 
the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime, 
the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, 
and other relevant factors.”11  
 
In Roviaro, Brady and Chambers, the defendant was denied the opportunity to present 
exculpatory evidence at trial, and in each case, the court held that this denial was sufficient 
for a due process violation. “The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in 
essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.”12 The 
relevant inquiry, then, is under what conditions is the government’s suppression of evidence 





                                                
8 Id,, at 309 
9 United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3rd Cir. 1978) 
10 Id, at 1204  
11 Roviaro, supra note 1, at 628-9 
12 Chambers, supra note 6, at 308 
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The Third Circuit 
In 1978, four young men assaulted Roy Phipps and stole $25. Glen Smith, Elton 
Rieara, Roland Georges and Elvis Smith were indicted. In a statement to the police, Ernesto 
Sanchez, another young man, implicated himself and three others, including Elvis Smith, but 
not including Glen Smith, Elton Rieara, or Roland Georges, in the assault. The defendants 
called Sanchez as a defense witness, but he refused to speak, claiming his right against self-
incrimination. His testimony would have been exculpatory for Glen Smith, Rieara, and 
Georges. After an unsuccessful attempt to admit his prior statement through an exception to 
the hearsay rule, the defense requested that the Attorney General’s office grant Sanchez use 
immunity. The Attorney General’s office agreed to grant use immunity to Sanchez, 
conditional on the United States Attorney’s consent. The U.S. Attorney never granted 
consent, Sanchez was not granted immunity, he did not testify, and the four men were 
convicted of robbery.  
On appeal, the Third Circuit in Government of The Virgin Islands v. Smith13 remanded 
the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Government’s failure to 
immunize Sanchez resulted in a due process violation for the three defendants for whom 
Sanchez’ testimony would have been exculpatory. The court held that if the district court 
finds, on remand, that the Government’s denial of a grant of immunity resulted from its 
“deliberate intention [to distort] the fact-finding process” then the court should acquit the 
defendants unless the Government grants use immunity, in which case the defendants would 
                                                
13 Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3rd Cir. 1980)  
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have a new trial.14 Here, the court relied on its decision in United States v. Morrison15, in which 
the Third Circuit held that the prosecution’s repeated intimidation of a defense witness16 
violated Morrison’s right to have witnesses give evidence in his favor. 17 The court’s remedy 
in Morrison was to order a new trial, and if the witness invoked her right against self-
incrimination, the Government must offer immunity or else the court would acquit 
Morrison.  
The Smith court, however, was not satisfied with the remedy of remanding the case 
for a determination of whether the prosecutor acted with the intent of distorting the fact-
finding process, in which case the court would acquit Smith et al unless the government 
offered Sanchez immunity. Herman and Morrison required that only if a prosecutor denied 
immunity to a defense witness in order to distort the fact-finding process could there be a 
due process violation. On remand, if the district court in Smith made that finding, then that 
would be sufficient for requiring the government to immunize the witness in order to 
proceed with the trial. 
But, the court in Smith argues that a defendant’s due process right to present an 
effective defense can be violated whether or not the prosecutor refused to immunize the 
defense witness with the intention of distorting the fact-finding process. The court writes that 
the right of the defendant to present an effective defense, implicated in Brady, Chambers and 
                                                
14 Id, at 969 
15 United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 233 (3rd Cir. 1976) 
16 In Morrison, the prosecutor repeatedly “reminded” the witness, by sending messages and by issuing a 
subpoena for her to appear in his office, that she had the right not to testify, and that if she were to falsely 
testify she could be charged with perjury. Morrison at 225-6  
17 “ ‘The right to offer the testimony of witnesses…is in plain terms the right to present a defense.’” Id, at 226, 
citing Washington v. Texas 388 U.S. 14, 19 
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Roviaro, is “not different in substance” than the right implicated in the Smith case.18 In those 
cases, the due process violation occurred not because the Government had acted with bad 
faith, but because the actions of the Government were such that the defendant was denied 
the opportunity to present an effective defense.19 There was a due process violation without 
prosecutorial bad faith.  
Thus, the Smith court argued that where a defendant is prevented from putting 
forward an effective defense by a prosecutor’s decision to refuse to immunize his witness, 
even where there is no bad, the due process right to present an effective defense is not 
honored. The court argued that there needed to be a new remedy to protect this right. This 
new remedy was judicial use immunity. 
In Herman, the court held that because there was no intention to distort the fact-
finding process on behalf of the government the court could not compel the government to 
offer immunity as a condition of trying the case. In cases where the Government did act in 
order to prevent the witness from presenting exculpatory testimony on the defendant’s behalf, 
“the court has inherent remedial power to require that the distortion be redressed by 
requiring a grant of use immunity to defense witnesses as an alternative to dismissal.”20 
However, where there is not a “distortion” by the government, the Herman court argues that 
the court could confer immunity on a witness to testify on the defendant’s behalf. The court 
mentions the due process right to present an effective defense, articulated in Chambers, and 
                                                
18 Smith, supra note 13, at 970 
19 Id, at 971 
20 Herman, supra note 9, at 1204 
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argues that this right, coupled with a court’s power to grant use immunity21, could “provide 
the basis for a grant of [judicial] immunity in the proper circumstances.”22 
 Like the cases that established a defendant’s right to have witnesses testify in his 
favor, Smith does not require that the due process violation arises because of bad faith on 
behalf of the prosecutor. Bad faith is required, however, in order to impose the remedy that 
the defendant be acquitted unless the prosecutor grants witness use immunity.  The court in 
Smith, thus, does not establish “a new or unique constitutional right, but rather…the 
prescription of a new remedy.”23 A due process violation, for the Smith court, obtains under 
certain conditions when the defendant’s witness is denied immunity. Under one set of 
conditions, where the denial is a willful distortion of the fact-finding process, one remedy is 
called for. But, where there is not willful distortion, there may yet be a due process violation. 
In this case, under certain conditions, the remedy of judicial use immunity is appropriate. But, 
it is not the case that in any instance of a due process violation the court can offer judicial use 
immunity.  
The Smith court found that the due process right is no less implicated in the 
immunity context than in the Brady or Chambers context.24 But, this does not mean that the 
immunity remedy is always applicable. That is to say, the mere fact that there is a due process 
violation, of the same sort as in the Brady or Chambers or Roviaro cases, does not mean that 
the judicial immunity remedy is applicable. In describing the possibility of the judicial use 
                                                
21 “The Supreme Court has authorized such grants in suppression hearings where the defendant’s testimony is 
necessary in order to determine whether a violation of his fourth amendment rights has occurred.” Id, at 1204, 
citing United States v. Simmons 390 U.S. 377 
22 Herman, supra note 9, at 1204 
23 Smith, supra note 13, at 971 
24 Smith, supra note 13, at 972 
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immunity remedy, the Herman court writes: “[i]t may be, for example, that such grants of 
immunity would on some occasions unduly interfere with important interests of the 
prosecution.”25 Where grants of immunity do interfere with important interests of the 
prosecution, the court would overstep its bounds to impose them. But, this does not 
necessarily mean that no due process violation has occurred; it just means that this remedy is 
not applicable.  
  The Smith court recognizes that because of the “unique and affirmative nature of the 
immunity remedy and fundamental considerations of separation of powers, grants of 
immunity to defense witnesses must be bounded by special safeguards and special 
conditions.”26 The court continues, “Chambers and Herman both dictate that the 
opportunities for judicial use of this immunity power must be clearly limited,” and then 
enumerates five conditions which must obtain in order for the court to grant immunity:  
1. “immunity must be properly sought in the district court; 
2. the defense witness must be available to testify; 
3. the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; 
4. the testimony must be essential; 
5. and there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail 
against a grant of immunity.”27 
 
The court vacated the sentences and remanded to the district court. It instructed the 
court to use its five-part test to determine whether judicial immunity is required. In that case, 
the court would immunize the defendant and there would be a new trial. The Third Circuit 
ordered the district court to determine whether the prosecutor engaged in bad faith 
                                                
25 Herman, supra note 9, at, 1204 
26 Smith, supra note 13, at 971 
27 Id, at 972 
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misconduct, in which case the court would acquit unless the prosecutor granted the witness 
use immunity. If the district court found neither judicial nor statutory immunity required, the 
judgment was to be reinstated.  
It seems that these are not the conditions for there to be a due process violation. 
These are the conditions the court imposed in order for the a court to grant use immunity as 
a remedy for a due process violation. Close attention to the language of the court seems to 
shows this: 
“While the constitutional violation in this case is the same as the violation 
found in the Chambers and Brady genre of cases i.e., depriving a defendant 
of clearly exculpatory evidence necessary to present an effective defense…” 
“That compulsion can only be accomplished in the context of a case such as 
the instant one, by granting immunity to a defense witness, once it is 
established, however, that the conditions for such a remedy have been 
satisfied.”28  
 Note that in the first sentence above the court writes, “the constitutional violation in 
this case[.]” This is just to say that there is a constitutional violation in the Smith case. The 
court continues that, even though there is a violation, the remedy can only be implemented 
if five particular conditions obtain. In Bazzano, Judge Garth describes the test he wrote in 
Smith: “we set out the requirements for invoking judicially fashioned defense witness 
immunity.”29 But, there is some reason to think that this is analysis is not correct.  
 There is some reason to think that the court does mean to say that, in the absence of 
willful distortion by the prosecution, these five conditions need to obtain in order for a due 
process violation to exist. At the end of the opinion, in its instructions to the lower court, it 
seems as though this is what the court meant. If there is a due process violation, there must 
                                                
28 Id, at 971 [emphasis added] 
29 United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 840 (3rd Cir. 1983) 
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be some remedy. And, just because one remedy is not appropriate does not mean that there 
is no other remedy for a due process violation. But, the court here instructs the district court, 
that if the case does not meet the five-part test for judicial immunity, and there was not 
prosecutorial distortion requiring statutory immunity, then there is no other remedy and the 
judgments stand. This suggests that there is no due process violation. There seems to be 
compelling reasons to think that the five-part test is a necessary condition for there to be a 
due process violation in the absence of prosecutorial bad faith, and compelling reasons to 
think that there can be a due process violation even if the five conditions of the Smith test are 
not met. Because there is evidence to support contradictory conclusions, adopting one 
conclusion in particular, without further evidence, is imprudent.  
In August, 2013, in a unanimous en banc decision, the court in Quinn held that the 
judiciary does not have the power to immunize witnesses, abrogating Smith.30 But, it retained 
the effective defense argument from Smith and its progeny.31 In addition to retaining the due 
process argument from Smith, it also retained Smith’s test with its five necessary conditions. 
The court, drawing from Straub32, writes that intent on the part of the prosecutor to distort 
the fact-finding process is not a necessary condition for a due process violation.33 Rather, the 
court is concerned only “with the effect of the prosecutor’s actions on the process afforded 
to the defendant.”34 In testing for a due process violation, the court retained Smith’s test, 
                                                
30 United States v. Quinn, 728 F.3d 243, 254 (3rd. Cir 2013)  
31 Id, at 253. 
32 United States v. Straub, 538 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) 
33 “‘The good faith of the [prosecutor] would be relevant if he were charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1503[,] which makes the intimidation of a federal witness a criminal offense. It is not, however, relevant to an 
inquiry into whether a defendant was denied his constitutional right.’ (emphasis in original.)” Quinn, supra note 30, 
at 260, citing Morrison, supra note 15, at 227  
34 Quinn, supra note 30, at 260. 
 13 
changing only the remedy, which is to offer the government another chance to immunize the 
defense witness as a condition on trying the case.35 This is also a departure from Third 
Circuit precedent about when the Government is required to offer the defendant’s witness 
immunity. Before Quinn, judicial use immunity was the remedy when the defendant had been 
deprived of his due process right because of something other than prosecutorial misconduct. 
Before Quinn, requiring the Government to immunize the defendant’s witness as a condition 
of trying the case was a remedy only when the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct. After 
Quinn, requiring the Government to offer immunity to the defendant’s witness is the remedy 
to a due process violation that occurs with, or without, misconduct.  
 One might believe that for the court to dismiss the case unless the government 
immunizes the defense witness is the same thing as for the court to grant immunity itself. 
However, the court’s remedy here deftly avoids overstepping its bounds. The court writes 
that, after it has determined, using the Smith test, that the government has erred by failing to 
immunize the defense witness, it does not violate separation of powers doctrine. The court 
rejects the contention that its new remedy is to “compel” the government to offer defense 
witness immunity. After finding that the defendant’s due process rights have been violated 
by the government’s initial refusal to immunize defense witness, the government may grant 
immunity,  
“or it may decide that denying the witness immunity is more important to its 
goals than seeking that conviction. But the remedy does not compel the 
                                                
35 “Once Smith’s five-part test is understood as a gauge of prosecutorial misconduct, the remedy for such a 
finding follows easily. It is vacating the conviction and allowing a new trial where the Government can elect to 
exercise its statutory authority to obtain a grant of immunity for the witness.” Id at 259. “If the Government 
refuses to immunize the witness in violation of the defendant’s due process right, the trial court can dismiss the 
charge against the defendant.” Id at 260.  
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Government to do anything. It simply prevents prosecutors from obtaining a 
conviction through a process that lacks the fairness afforded by due 
process.”36 
While there is compelling reason to think that Smith intended the test only to be used 
to determine whether a particular remedy to a due process violation was appropriate, the 
Quinn court reads the five-part test from the Smith court as a test for due process violation. 
The Quinn court writes, “[t]hus in Smith we also created a new five-factor test that focused 
on whether the defendant ‘is prevented from presenting exculpatory evidence which is 
crucial to his case.’”37 But, the court in Quinn might be misrepresenting the context in which 
it cites Smith. For context, it is necessary to examine the full quotation from which the court 
selects:  
“[T]he need for ‘judicial’ immunity is triggered, not by prosecutorial 
misconduct or intentional distortion of the trial process, but by the fact that 
the defendant is prevented from presenting exculpatory evidence which is 
crucial to his case.”38 
  
It is one thing for a test to determine whether a defendant’s due process right has been 
violated and another for a test to be “triggered…by” the due process violation. If the correct 
reading is the former, then any time the five-part test is not met, there is no due process 
violation. If the latter, then we cannot infer that there is no due process violation from a 
failure to pass the test. But it does follow from failing the Smith test that a particular remedy 
is not warranted. Indeed, the Smith court suggests that the test is merely for determining 
whether the remedy of judicial immunity is warranted. Either way, Smith’s progeny, including 
                                                
36 Id. 
37 Quinn, supra note 30, at 258, citing Smith, supra note 13 at 969 
38 Smith, supra note 13, at 969 
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Quinn, regards the five-part test as a test for due process. The court in Quinn writes, at 
different points: 
“Although we characterized this test as distinct from an inquiry in to 
prosecutorial misconduct, it is nonetheless about the Government’s trial 
decisions.”39 
“The five-factor test aids this inquiry for prosecutorial misconduct, and we 
continue its use today.”40 
“But we keep the test we created in [Smith], which we now recognize as 
supplementing our deliberate distortion test for prosecutorial misconduct.”41  
 
But, there’s good reason to think that this it not how the Smith court intended the 
test to be used. If it didn’t, then there is reason to think that the Third Circuit has imposed 
too high a standard for determining whether a due process violation has occurred by 











                                                
39 Quinn, supra note 30, at 258 
40 Smith, supra note 13, at  259 
41 Id, at  261 [emphasis added] 
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History 
 To ensure that a subpoenaed witness who threatens to invoke his Fifth Amendment 
right will testify, the Government has historically offered immunity against future 
prosecution in exchange for testimony.42 The Government also offers witnesses powerful 
incentives, including lighter sentences for their own convictions, in exchange for testimony.43 
But, offering immunity imposes a cost. If a witness is granted transactional (or “blanket” 
immunity), which was the only immunity available before 1970, he cannot be prosecuted for 
crimes related to his testimony. Government witness are often implicated in the crime (or a 
related crime) about which they are to testify, and so the cost of immunizing them is high.44  
Insofar as the government can offer immunity only if it is in the public interest to do so,45 
the government has to weigh the cost of forfeiting the ability to prosecute the witness 
altogether to obtain testimony against the value of prosecuting the defendant.  
 Recognizing this problem, Congress in 1970 passed the Federal Immunity of 
Witnesses Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 6001-05. This statute requires the prosecutor to 
                                                
42 This dates back, at least, to 18th Century common law countries. Leonard N. Sosnov. Separation of Powers Shell 
Game: The Federal Witness Immunity Act. 73 Temp. L. Rev. 171, 176 (2000).  
43 In Straub, the court found that the defendant’s due process right was violated when the government 
immunized eleven of twelve of its own witnesses but refused to immunize even one of the defendant’s. Some 
of the government’s witnesses received downward departure of three to five years in exchange for their 
testimony. Straub, supra note 32, at 1152. Professor H. Richard Uviller argues that if downward departure is 
available for the prosecution to offer to witnesses, this option should also be available to the defendant. Uviller 
writes, “there is no reason I can think of why a downward departure in sentence should be justified exclusively 
on the report of aid to the prosecution. Surely credible assistance to the defense in promoting the acquittal of 
an innocent person is as worthy a service as credible assistance to the prosecutor in securing the conviction of a 
guilty person.” H. Richard Uviller. “Symposium: Perspectives on the Role of Cooperators and Informants: No 
Sauce for the Gander: Valuable Consideration for Helpful Testimony from Tainted Witnesses in Criminal 
Cases.” 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 771, 788. (2002) 
44 Koblitz, Donald. “Note: ‘The Public Has a Claim to Every Man’s Evidence’: The Defendant’s Constitutional 
Right to Witness Immunity.” 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1211, 1230. (1978) 
45 Sosnov, supra note 42, at 182  
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request immunity through the Attorney General’s office;46 he can only make such a request 
when the testimony is “necessary to the public interest;47 he can only make such a request 
when the intended witness has invoked his right against self-incrimination;48 and, the witness 
must testify, having been so-ordered.49 But most important is the provision permitting use 
immunity: “no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any 
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be 
used against the witness in any criminal case” except for perjury.50  
Pursuant to Kastigar,51 the court can compel witnesses who have been granted 
immunity to testify, even if they plead the Fifth.52 In light of Kastigar, the prosecutor has an 
increased incentive to grant immunity to witnesses; the prosecutor knows that if he grants 
immunity, the witness can be made to testify. But, the witness is not granted immunity from 
all further prosecution; the statute merely requires that any testimony presented while 
immunized be excluded at future trials where the witness is the defendant.5354 
                                                
46 18 U.S.C § 6003 
47 Id.  
48 18 U.S.C § 6002 & 6003 
49 It’s not clear whether the court in Kastigar, infra note 25, would have ruled the way it did had Congress not 
passed this law. One might stipulate that the law saying that the right against self-incrimination is not absolute 
spurred the Supreme Court to hold as it did. But, this is mere speculation.  
50 18 U.S.C § 6002 
51 Kastigar v. United States 406, U.S. 441 (1972) 
52 Id, at 453 (holding that “immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.”) 
53 There is a high bar for the prosecution to show that none of the evidence in subsequent trials presented 
against the witness was derived from his immunized testimony. In Kastigar, the court writes that a defendant 
who was given use immunity and testified at a previous trial “need only show that he testified under a grant of 
immunity in order to shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to 
use was derived from legitimate independent sources.” Kastigar, supra note 51, at 461 [emphasis added]. In 
Bazzano, the court writes “[Granting] the probationer immunity would require the state to prove that evidence 
it seeks to use against a probationer in a subsequent criminal trial is derived from a source wholly independent 
of his previously immunized testimony.” The court continues: “If the state cannot meet its burden in such a 
case, the result will be the loss of potentially crucial evidence. Bazzano, supra note 29, at 845  
 18 
 From 1980 until 2013, when the court in Quinn55 struck down judicial authority to 
grant use immunity, the Third Circuit considered the merits of appeals for the district court’s 
failure to grant use immunity to defense witnesses.56 In doing so, it considered the merits of 
the appeal according to the enumerated standards put forward in Smith. Even though the 
court in Quinn overturned a crucial holding in Smith, that courts could grant judicial witness 
immunity, it kept the five-part test. That is, even though the court in Quinn held (with 
virtually every other court57) that the judiciary lacks the authority to grant use immunity, it 
retained all of Smith’s (and the Third Circuit’s subsequent) reasoning that a defendant’s due 
process right is violated when the five conditions are met and his witnesses are not 
immunized. The crucial distinction between the two rulings is the remedy. In Smith, the 
remedy was for the court to immunize defense witnesses. But, in Quinn, the remedy was for 
the judge to order a new trial to give the government another opportunity to extend use 
immunity to defense witness; if it refuses, then the court dismisses the charges against the 
                                                                                                                                            
54 In much of the scholarly literature and dicta, this burden on the prosecution is mentioned as a cost to the 
government and a reason not to grant use immunity to defense witnesses. Richard L. Stone. “Note: The Case 
Against a Right to Defense Witness Immunity.” 83 Colum. L. Rev. 139, n4. (1983).  (adding that in order to 
shield the witness’s proffered testimony from being used against him at his own trial, “the prosecutors most 
knowledgeable about an investigation may in some circumstances be obliged to forgo any further contact with 
the witness and arrange for a new team of investigators and prosecutors to pursue the case against him.” The 
author uses this as an example of potential significant costs to granting use immunity. Note well that these 
issues do not arise in cases where the government grants transactional immunity because the witness is 
immunized from prosecution of any crime related to the one he testified about. 
55 Quinn, supra note 30 
56 A survey of requests and grants for defense witness immunity found that the Third Circuit granted the 
highest percent of requests of any circuit: 5/46, and that nine of twelve circuits have never granted defense 
witness immunity. (The other two circuits to do so are the Second [1/59] and the Ninth [6/97]. See Nathaniel 
Lipanovich. “Note: Resolving the Circuit Split on Defense Witness Immunity: How the Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Test Has Failed Defendants and What the Supreme Court Should Do About it.” 91 Tex. L. Rev. 
175, 178 (2012).  
57 All other courts that is, except for the New Mexico Supreme Court, in  State v. Belanger  146 N.M. 357 (2009) 
(holding that trial courts have authority to grant use immunity.) See Andy Scholl. “Note and Comment: State v. 
Belanger and New Mexico’s Lone Stance on Allowing Defense Witness Immunity.” 40 N.M.L. Rev. 421. 
(2010). 
 19 
defendant.58 Also, the Quinn court treats the five-part test as offering five necessary 
conditions on a due process violation in the absence of willful prosecutorial misconduct. 



















                                                
58 Quinn, supra note 30 at 259-60 
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Questions Surrounding Smith  
Even before Smith, some commentators argued for such a defendant’s right to have 
witnesses granted judicial use immunity. Some argued that this right follows from a due 
process right to a fair trial.59 Others argued that the right to judicial use immunity follows 
from the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause, reasoning that in its very wording 
the Compulsory Process Clause “places upon the state certain affirmative duties in securing 
the testimony of witnesses in [sic] the defendant’s behalf.”60  
 Since Smith, commentators and judges have addressed many questions in addition to 
questions about what the Due Process and Compulsory Process Clauses require. They have 
addressed whether the judiciary has the authority to grant immunity, as the Third Circuit said 
it does. With the exception of a few commentators, judges outside the Third Circuit have 
answered with a resounding “no.”61 Other pertinent domains of inquiry have been the exact 
                                                
59 “The proper solution demands recasting the issue not as the defendant’s right to immunize witnesses, but as 
the defendant’s constitutional right to obtain favorable evidence.” [emphasis in the original] Koblitz, supra note 44, 
at 1213.  
60 The state can usually satisfy its duty by issuing subpoenas and then punishing witnesses who are non-
compliant. However, the subpoena and threat of punishment are not available when the witness will not testify 
for reasons of self-incrimination. Just as the courts have a duty to compel testimony by subpoena, when that is 
not available, they have a duty to compel testimony by immunity. 
 “Note: The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses.” 91 Harv. L. Rev. 
1266, 1267-8 (1978) [emphasis in the original][NB: this is an unsigned note.] 
61 In most cases on this topic, the opinion lists the most recent case in each non-Third Circuit circuit to reject 
the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Smith. In Third Circuit cases, the judge acknowledges that the Third Circuit 
stands alone and offers a similar list. I will not recreate such an exhaustive list of every circuit’s most recent 
decision rejecting Smith. However, here is a representative sample; some judges are quite harsh. 
“Notwithstanding the Third Circuit’s pronouncement, the effective defense theory has been roundly rejected 
by other courts, most of which have agreed that the power to grant immunity properly belongs to the 
Executive Branch.” Curtis v. Duval, 124 F.3d 1, 9 (9th Cir. 1997). “Every court of appeals which has considered 
the question has rejected the Third CircuitsSmith [sic] holding as being a violation of the separation of powers.” 
U.S. . Capozzi, 883 F.2d 608, 614 (8th Cir. 1989). “[While] the Third Circuit’s desire to insure [sic] that criminal 
defendants will have every opportunity to present exculpatory evidence is admirable, the federal courts simply 
lack the power to effectuate that aim by immunizing witnesses.” United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 527 (6th 
Cir. 1984). “Virtually all jurisdictions recognize that use immunity is a creature of statute which can be 
conferred only by the Executive Branch of government. However, the Third Circuit held otherwise in Smith.” 
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nature of the separation of powers doctrine62 and discussions about what the exact costs to 
the government are when it grants immunity. One such cost that has received a great 
amount of attention is the worry that establishing a due process right to defense witness 
immunity confers on the defendant the ability to give an “immunity bath” to his 
compatriots: his friends testify for the defense at his trial and in their own trials it is much 
more difficult to convict them because much of the inculpatory evidence is excluded.63 The 
court in Turkish raised a related worry: “cooperative perjury.”64 But, the remainder of the 
paper will address two of the requirements of the Smith test.  
• “[T]he proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory.” 
• “[T]here must be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant 
of immunity.”65 
In general, the courts have required too high a showing in order to meet the standards. 
The standards for a finding of a violation of due process ought to be lower than they are. In 
part, this follows from a belief that the original Smith test was meant to be a test for the 
                                                                                                                                            
[list of supporting cases omitted] United States v. Hunter 672 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir. 1982). “We need not dwell 
on the late, unlamented effective defense theory….[recognizing] that the power to direct witness immunity 
customarily is reserved to the Executive Branch, we recently interred the effective defense theory. It is not 
good law in this circuit and the appellant cannot profit by it.” Castro, 129 f.3d 226, 232 (1st Cir.1997).  
62 See United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, Fn 7 (3rd Cir. 1992), in which the court argues that because it only 
has the authority to grant immunity “when the interests of the executive branch would not be harmed by the 
judiciary’s exercise of power,” it has accommodated the separation of powers concerns raised by other circuits. 
In Quinn, the court addresses this concern and reverses its thought on the separation of powers. (Finding that 
“judicial use immunity impinges on the separation of powers between the Executive and Judicial Branches of 
our Federal Government.”) supra note 11, at 260. 
63 “Note,” supra note 60, at 1273, citing the court in In re Kilgo, 484 f.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973).   
64 “Co-defendants could secure use immunity for each other, and each immunized witness could exonerate his 
co-defendant at a separate trial by falsely accepting sole responsibility for the crime, secure in the knowledge 
that his admission could not be used at his own trial for the substantive offense. The threat of a perjury 
conviction, with penalties frequently far below substantive offenses, could not be relied upon to prevent such 
tactics. Moreover, this maneuver would substantially undermine the opportunity for joint trials, with 
consequent expense, delay, and burden upon disinterested witnesses and the judicial system.” United States v. 
Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775-6 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
65 Smith, supra note 13 at 972. 
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remedy to a due process violation, not the due process violation itself. This may be incorrect. 
If it is, and the test is properly regarded as a test for a due process violation, then it is still the 






















 The Third Circuit does not define precisely what it means by “clearly exculpatory.” 
Since Smith, the court has, at times, clarified the requirement by providing a positive account 
of what it is, but more frequently, by giving examples of what does not constitute clearly 
exculpatory testimony. 
The principle linking United States v. Perez66 and United States v. Whiteford67 is that 
testimony is not clearly exculpatory when it is directly contradicted by the witness’s own 
prior statements. In Perez, the court writes “because any exculpatory testimony that [the 
witness] might offer on behalf of Perez would be severely impeached by his prior 
inculpatory statement against her, Perez could not establish that the proffered testimony was 
‘clearly exculpatory.’”68 In a similar vein, the court in Whiteford writes “The court’s 
determination that [the witness’] testimony would not be ‘clearly exculpatory’ for [the 
codefendant] was not an abuse of discretion, because in multiple portions of [the witness’] 
statements to the police, she inculpated [the codefendant].”69  
 In United States v. Thomas70 and United States v. Mike71, the court argues that testimony 
that serves only to call into question the truth of the government’s witness is not clearly 
exculpatory. In Thomas, two of the government’s witnesses refuted what the defense witness 
would have said. Thus, the jury would have had to make a credibility determination to decide 
which witnesses were more reliable. Because of this, the testimony was “at best speculative” 
                                                
66 United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 348 (3rd Cir. 2002) 
67 United States v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 348, 363-4 (3rd Cir. 2012) 
68 Perez, supra note 66, at 348  
69 Whiteford, supra note 68, at 363-4  
70 United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 365-6 (3rd Cir. 2004) 
71 United States v. Mike, 655 F.3d 167, 173 (3rd Cir. 2001) 
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and not clearly exculpatory.72 The court in Mike agrees with Thomas, but adds that Thomas 
properly denied the immunity grant, not just because the proffered testimony would have 
refuted a government witness, but because the government’s case was sufficiently strong 
without his testimony. But, the court cautions that evidence that a government’s witness is 
unreliable can be clearly exculpatory testimony. The court writes: “[n]othing in these cases 
[Thomas, Ammar73, Smith] rules out the possibility that a defense witness’s testimony can be 
clearly exculpatory when it helps to establish, among other things, that a government witness’s 
testimony is not credible.”74 Other Circuits have made similar statements about what does not 
count as exculpatory, but they have been less forthcoming with positive accounts.75 
 The Third Circuit offers some affirmative thoughts on what constitutes clearly 
exculpatory evidence. In United States v. Lowell76, the court upheld the district court’s refusal 
to grant immunity, contrasting the facts of the case with those of Smith. In Smith “the court 
was faced with a probable certainty77 that [the witness’] testimony would exonerate three of 
the convicted felons.” But, in Lowell “[the witness’] testimony, even if believed, would not in 
itself exonerate Lowell; apparently, [Smith witness’] testimony alone, if believed, would have 
                                                
72 Thomas, supra note 70, at 365-6  
73 United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 1983) 
74 Mike, supra note 71, at 173 [emphasis added] 
75 Testimony is not clearly exculpatory and is “obviously without merit” when all other facts in the case suggest 
that the witness is lying. United States v. Flaherty 668 F.2d 566, 579 (1st Cir. 1981); Testimony is not clearly 
exculpatory when “[the] proffered testimony of the two witnesses merely established incriminating evidence of 
a third party, but in no way exonerated the defendant here.” United States v. Hardrich, 707 F.2d 992, 994 (8th Cir. 
1983); (Evidence was not clearly exculpatory because the “testimony would have been marginally exculpatory at 
best,” but not explaining what the difference between marginally exculpatory and clearly exculpatory is. Pennell, 
supra note 31 at 529; Testimony is not clearly exculpatory when the witness “had no favorable testimony to 
offer on behalf of the defense.” United States v. Robaina, 39 F.3d 858, Fn4 (8th Cir. 1994) 
76 United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1981) 
77 The court does not explain what “probable certainty” means. 
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required acquittal.”78 The court in Lowell believes that the expected testimony can satisfy the 
clearly exculpatory standard only if presenting the testimony would result in exoneration.  
The court in Quinn seems to have not such a high standard in mind, however. The 
court discusses the clearly exculpatory standard in light of Quinn’s request for it to be “less 
exacting” in the standard, and for the court to read it to mean “materially favorable to the 
defense on the issue of guilt” or when it “could contribute substantially to raising a 
reasonable doubt.”79 In response, however, the court rejects the defendant’s suggestion:  
“[the] existence of conflicting evidence does not affect, however, whether the 
defense evidence is exculpatory, though it may affect its weight. Thus, 
though exculpatory on its own, defense evidence that is overwhelmingly 
undercut or undermined by substantial prosecution evidence in the record 
becomes so lacking in credibility that it cannot be clearly exculpatory.”8081  
 
In United States v. Steele, the court upheld the district court’s decision to deny use 
immunity.82 In doing so, it contrasted “relevant” evidence with “clearly exculpatory” 
evidence.” “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.’”83 Quinn rejects merely material evidence as 
clearly exculpatory in the same way that Steele rejects merely relevant evidence. The best 
account of clearly exculpatory, according to the courts, is the following: testimony that, if 
                                                
78 Lowell, supra note 76, at 965 
79 Quinn, supra note 30, at 262 
80 Id, at 263 [emphasis in the original] 
81 Even after 33 years, the court does not do a great job of clearing up this ambiguity. The purpose of the 
paragraph from which this is drawn is to “clarify” the clearly exculpatory standard. However, they explain the 
standard by saying that evidence is not clearly exculpatory when it is overwhelmingly undercut or undermined by 
substantial prosecution evidence. But, if the goal was to understand the use of the word clearly, one might think 
the job is not done by reference to the words overwhelmingly and substantial.  
82 United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793 (3rd Cir. 1982) 
83 Id, at 808, citing Fed.R.Evid., at 401.  
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admitted, would compel a not-guilty verdict. There is precedent for this reasoning. The court 
in United States v. Agurs, one of Brady’s progeny, writes, “[t]he mere possibility that an item of 
undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome 
of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.”84  
 The courts have interpreted this standard too strictly. Perez and Whiteford found that a 
witness’ testimony is not clearly exculpatory when he contradicts his own prior statements. 
Thomas and Mike found that a witness’ testimony is not clearly exculpatory when the 
testimony functions solely to contradict the government’s statement. But, it seems like these 
cases could cause a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors. If this is the case, then the 
evidence is clearly exculpatory.85 A witness’ contradiction of a government witness will likely 
not carry much weight in the courtroom. But, because of the exacting standard of proof in 
criminal trials, the jurors do not need to be convinced of the defendant’s innocence to 
render a not-guilty verdict. The mere contradiction of a government witness could be 







                                                
84 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976) [emphasis added] 
85 “It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, a 
constitutional error has been committed.” Id, at 113 
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Countervailing Interests 
 Smith requires, inter alia, that for a grant of immunity to be constitutionally required, 
“[t]here must be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of 
immunity.” Quinn rejects the “inherent authority” of a court to immunize witnesses for the 
defense but retains the Smith test as a test for a violation of due process. There is a 
substantive question whether Smith intended the test to be for a due process determination or 
a test for whether the judicial immunity remedy is called for. If the former, there is reason to 
view the requirements of the test as less strict than one ought to if it were the latter. 
Whatever the Smith court intended, the Quinn court has adopted it as a test for due process, 
and thus, one must be sure that the interpretation and implementation comports with due 
process.  
The test involves the no countervailing interests test, and for this reason it is 
important to understand and implement the requirement correctly. Although in many of its 
decisions the Third Circuit gives a thoughtful account of the weighing of interests, in 
interpreting and implementing this requirement the Third Circuit repeatedly makes two 
assumptions without sufficient warrant. First, the court assumes without sufficient warrant 
that any strong governmental interest is sufficient to countervail against a grant of immunity. 
Second, even if the court’s first assumption is correct, it imposes too high a standard for 
something to be a strong governmental interest.  
The First Problem 
In interpreting the Smith test’s fifth necessary condition: that “there must be no 
strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of immunity[,]” the Third 
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Circuit assumes that any strong governmental interest countervails. But, there is reason to 
question this assumption; the Smith court might have meant that only some strong 
governmental interests countervail, and when there are none of those interests, 
notwithstanding the presence of strong governmental interests that do not countervail, the 
fifth condition of the Smith test is met. One must determine whether the clause “which 
countervail against a grant of immunity” is a restrictive or nonrestrictive clause. Because 
there are are indicia of both kinds of clauses, it is not clear what kind of clause it is.  
“For relative pronouns referring to anything other than people, use that to introduce 
a restrictive clause and which (after a comma) to introduce a nonrestrictive clause.”86 So for 
example, if one wanted to indicate that cacti were prohibited from the party, he would say:  
A. “There must be no cacti, which are plants, at the party.”  
In Sentence A, “which are plants” is a nonrestrictive clause. To remove it from the 
sentence would not change the meaning of the sentence. To include it in the sentence 
perhaps tells the audience something about cacti, and perhaps the reason he has made the 
policy, but, it does not restrict the kinds cacti excluded from the party; all cacti are excluded. 
But, if the party planner loved cacti as long as they have not bloomed with flowers, he might 
say:  
B. “There must be no cacti that have bloomed at the party. 
In Sentence B, “that have bloomed” is a restrictive clause. To remove it from the 
sentence would change the meaning of the sentence. To include the restrictive clause is to say 
that cacti of a particular type are prohibited.  
                                                
86 Garner, Bryan. The Redbook: A Manual on Legal Style. West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, 2006, at 156.  
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It is clear what kind of clause occurs in each of the above sentences, both because of 
usage and context. Restrictive clauses are introduced by that, and nonrestrictive clauses by 
which. Restrictive clauses are not set off from the rest of the sentence by commas, whereas 
nonrestrictive clauses are.87 Also, the context of the clauses tells the audience what kind of 
clause they (likely) are. Cacti are necessarily plants, and so it does not make sense to put 
“which are plants” in a restrictive clause. One could construct a grammatical sentence in 
which “that are plants” follows “cacti” in a restrictive clause, but it would not thereby 
restrict the set of cacti because all cacti are plants. Similarly, one could construct a 
grammatical sentence in which “which have blossomed” follows “cacti” in a nonrestrictive 
clause, but the sentence would generate a false implication: that all cacti have blossomed. So, 
one can look to usage or to context for help in determining whether a clause is restrictive or 
nonrestrictive.  
In evaluating the fifth condition of the Smith test, neither usage nor context is 
helpful. If “which countervail against a grant of immunity” is a restrictive clause, then the 
court meant to refer only to the strong governmental interests that countervail, out of a set 
of all of the strong countervailing interests, some of which countervail, and some of which 
might not. If it is a nonrestrictive clause, then the court is just informing the reader about a 
characteristic of strong governmental interests (that they countervail).  
The Third Circuit, since Smith, has interpreted the clause as nonrestrictive. But, there 
is reason to doubt this assumption. Although the clause is introduced by “which,” which is 
an indication that the clause is nonrestrictive, no commas separate it from the rest of the 
                                                
87 They can also be offset by parentheses or dashes.  
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sentence, which is an indication that the clause is restrictive. So, the clause has indicia of 
both restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, and to the extent that the use of “that” or 
“which” is as telling as the presence or absence of commas, there is no reason from usage to 
think one way or the other. But, there is some reason to think that the evidence weighs in 
favor of its being a restrictive clause.  
While a nonrestrictive clause must be set off from the rest of the sentence and a 
restrictive clause must not be, there is less firm a rule about which relative pronoun to use in 
a restrictive clause. “By rule, that is used to introduce a restrictive clause only; it is always an 
error to use that to introduce a nonrestrictive clause.” But, “[i]t’s not an outright blunder to 
use which to introduce a restrictive clause.”88 So, which relative pronoun the court used 
cannot be controlling here, because on the pain of “slight pomposity,” according to Bryan 
Garner, the court could have used “which” to introduce a restrictive clause, thereby breaking 
a convention, but not a rule. But, in order not to ascribe pomposity to the court, the clause 
has equal indicia of both nonrestrictive and restrictive clauses. 
In the absence of dispositive evidence from usage, one might turn to context for 
guidance. In Sentences A and B, the audience’s knowledge of cacti together with the context 
of utterance (proscribing certain things from a party) can determine whether the clause is 
restrictive or nonrestrictive. But, in the cacti case, the use of context relied on the audience’s 
knowledge of the properties of the plant and of the party planner’s purpose in making the 
pronouncement, in the absence of indicia from usage, to determine whether the clause was 
restrictive or nonrestrictive. But in the Smith clause, the purpose of determining what kind of 
                                                
88 Garner, supra note 86, at 157 
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clause it is is to determine how we should understand the court’s intent. Thus, we cannot rely 
on our antecedent knowledge of whether all strong governmental interests countervail to 
determine whether the court meant to say that all strong governmental interests countervail.  
Instead of looking at usage or context of utterance, one can look to how the courts 
after Smith interpreted the test. This might be a solution. Indeed, it is clear from Smith’s 
progeny that the courts believed that any strong governmental interests does countervail—
that the clause at issue was nonrestrictive. But, there is reason to be wary of this.  
There is reason to think that the Quinn court changed the way the test operated. The 
Quinn treats the test as a test for a due process violation, whereas there is substantial reason 
to think that the court in Smith uses it only to determine whether judicial use immunity is the 
appropriate remedy for an existing due process violation. If this is the case, then the 
standards of the test might need to be adjusted in order to comport with due process. Even 
if Smith meant that any strong governmental interest countervails against a grant of immunity, 
this may only be relevant for determining whether the court can offer witness immunity. 
Understood, in 2013, as a test for the due process violation, faithfully adapting the Smith 
standard requires the court to apply a less exacting standard, and this less exacting standard 
may be interpreting the fifth condition of the Smith test as a restrictive clause.  
If the Third Circuit has erred in in its interpretation of the Smith test, then there is 
reason to doubt whether its holdings on due process violations have been correct.  
In United States v. Santtini, the court cites United States v. Sampson, 661 F. Supp. 514, 
520 (W.D.Pa.1987) which held that  
“Smith does not require a court, which has identified a ‘strong governmental 
interest,’ to weigh that interest against the defendant’s need for testimony; 
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instead, ‘the existence of a strong opposing governmental interest that 
cannot be accommodated forbids any weighing and any judicial immunity.’ 
We conclude that where a compelling government interest exists, a court 
simply may not invoke its ‘inherent’ authority to [grant immunity to defense 
witnesses].”89  
The court continues this line of reasoning in a footnote: 
“[the no countervailing interests] requirement also seeks to accommodate 
separation of powers concerns in that it provides for the possibility of 
‘judicial immunity’ only when the interests of the executive branch would not 
be harmed by the judiciary’s exercise of power.” [fn7] 
  
In United States v. Cohen90, the court makes two claims:  
C. “A potential prosecution of the prospective witness is a sufficient 
governmental interest to countervail against a grant of immunity.”91 
D. “Therefore, because the Government had a strong interest in not 
immunizing Lipoff, the district court correctly denied judicial immunity.”92  
Claim C makes a substantive claim that a particular kind of interest countervails 
against a grant of immunity—that the government might want to prosecute the witness in 
the future. Claim D states that because the government had a strong interest in not 
immunizing the witness, immunity was properly denied. One might argue that Claim C is 
false, (and there is reason to support this contention,) but it makes a substantive point about 
what kinds of interests countervail. Claim D does not. According to Claim D, the 
government’s having a “strong interest” is sufficient for denying immunity.  
If there is reason to doubt that the Smith court meant the clause at issue as a 
nonrestrictive clause, then there is reason to doubt whether the courts in Santtini and Cohen 
are applying the test correctly.   
                                                
89 United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 599 (3rd Cir. 1992) [emphasis added] 
90 United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796 (3rd. Cir 1999) 
91 Id, at 802 
92 Id. 
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The Second Problem 
 Even if the court in Smith meant the test’s countervailing interest requirement to 
mean that any strong governmental interest in fact countervails against a grant of immunity, 
there remains a substantial question: what counts as a strong governmental interest? Since 
Lowell, the courts have interpreted the strong governmental interest requirement to be satisfied 
when the government has a possible future interest in prosecuting the witness. While this 
may be what the Smith court intended, the courts justify this position with an improper 
attribution to Lowell, the first judicial witness immunity case, to follow Smith. 
Lowell held that the testimony the witness would have given failed the clearly 
exculpatory test and therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of a grant of immunity for a 
defense witness.93 The court wrote that the facts were sufficiently different from those in 
Smith to warrant different rulings. In Lowell, “[the witness’] testimony, even if believed, would 
not in itself exonerate Lowell; apparently, [Smith’s witness’] testimony alone, if believed, 
would have required acquittal.”94 So, the court in Lowell distinguishes its facts from those in 
Smith by saying that, whereas in Smith the testimony was clearly exculpatory, in Lowell, the 
testimony was not. So, the defendant in Lowell was not entitled to judicial use immunity for 
his witnesses. 
One other way the facts in Lowell are different from the facts in Smith is in the 
governmental interests implicated. In Smith, the government gave no reason, (and it appears 
                                                
93 Lowell, supra note 76 
94 Id, at 965 
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there was none to be given),95 why the witness had been refused immunity. But in Lowell, the 
court points out that that “the prosecution does have an arguable reason for denying 
immunity. For it may yet prosecute [the witness].”96  
It is not at first apparent why the court included this last sentence here; indeed, it is 
easy to mistake its purpose in so doing. From its analysis of the probative value of the 
witness’s testimony (low), it reasoned that the clearly exculpatory standard was not met, and 
therefore it followed that Lowell did not meet all five of Smith’s necessary conditions.  
Why, then, did it bother discussing the governmental interest? Is it to show that, in 
addition to the clearly exculpatory standard not being met, the countervailing interest 
standard was also not met? The court does not say whether, were the evidence clearly 
exculpatory, the governmental interest would have been sufficient to satisfy due process.  
There is reason to think that the court did not intend this passage to support the 
conclusion that this governmental interest in fact countervailed against a grant of immunity 
is the context. In addition to the Smith test for granting immunity, there is another test for 
determining a due process violation: if the prosecutor acted intentionally to distort the fact-
finding process. The court in Lowell held that no such violation occurred. As evidence of 
this, it says that one possible reason that the prosecution withheld immunity was because it 
may yet prosecute the witness.  
“Here…the prosecutor’s conduct evinced no ‘deliberate intention of distorting the 
factfinding [sic] process.’ And we note in support of that conclusion that the prosecution 
                                                
95 “The record reveals that Mr. Leonard Francis of [the Virgin Island Attorney General’s office] had offered to 
grant Sanchez use immunity on the condition, promoted only out of prosecutorial courtesy, that the United 
States Attorney consent. For reasons which were unexplained at trial and which the United States Attorney did not explain to 
this court at oral argument, this consent was never granted.” Smith, supra note 13, at 967 [emphasis added] 
96 Lowell, supra note 76, at 965 
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does have an arguable reason for denying immunity. For it may yet prosecute 
Montalbano.”97  
 
Note that the court points out this reason to show that the prosecution acted 
without the intent of distorting the fact-finding process. However, in the Third Circuit, that 
the prosecution acted with the intent of distorting the fact-finding process is not necessary to 
find that the district court erred in denying the defense witness immunity. Since Smith, the 
due process violation occurs when the government intentionally distorts the fact-finding 
process or the five conditions set by Smith are met. The court in Lowell notes the 
prosecution’s reason for denying immunity not to show that the Smith test is not satisfied, 
but to show that that the prosecutor was not intentionally distorting the fact-finding process 
and therefore that did not cause the due process violation. Subsequent courts have missed 
the limited scope of this comment in Judge Rosenn’s subtle opinion. 
 Since Lowell, the courts have inferred from the government’s possible interest in 
prosecuting the defense’s witness to a countervailing strong governmental interest. They cite 
precedent in Lowell, but for reasons described above, this is an improper inference.  
 In Bazzano, Chief Judge Seitz writes “that a defense witness may be subject to future 
prosecution is a legitimate reason for denying him immunity.”98 C.J. Seitz relies on Lowell, 
where the court explains that the difference between it and Smith lies partly in that, in Smith, 
the prosecutor had no reason for denying immunity, whereas in Lowell, it did. But, in Lowell 
the court argues that the proffered evidence is not clearly exculpatory, and that is sufficient 
for affirming the district court’s decision to withhold immunity. It is true, as Seitz cites 
                                                
97 Id [emphasis added] 
98 Bazzano, supra note 29, at 845 
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Lowell, that the court in Lowell writes that the possible future prosecution of Montalbano is a 
reason for denying immunity, but it never indicates that it is sufficient. It mentions it only to 
show that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by refusing to grant immunity in 
order to gain a tactical advantage. C.J. Seitz’s conclusion that the court in Lowell “held that 
the possibility that a defense witness may be subject to future prosecution is a legitimate 
reason for denying him immunity”99 is wrong. This was not the holding in Lowell. C.J. Seitz 
reads Smith’s no countervailing strong interest test to mean any interest in future prosecution. 
The actual reasoning in Lowell does not support this and neither does Smith.  
All three of the judges who sat on Smith sat on Bazzano, which the Third Circuit 
heard en banc. In Bazzano, the court held per curiam that the district court had not erred by 
refusing to grant immunity to the defendant’s witnesses.100 But, in the divided opinion, Judge 
Garth, the author of Smith, wrote a minority opinion on behalf of all of the judges who sat 
for Smith, (as well as one other judge).101 Judge Garth writes that defendant’s contention that 
the district court erred in not granting the witness use immunity to his two witnesses failed. 
But, he argues that it fails the Smith test because it was not properly sought in the district 
court and because it was not clearly exculpatory.102 He makes no mention of countervailing 
interests. It is Chief Judge Seitz, who writes for the majority, who says that “the possibility 
that a defense witness may be subject to future prosecution is a legitimate reason for denying 
                                                
99 Id, at 841 
100 Id, at 829 
101 Id, at 836 
102 “At no time during the revocation hearing did [the co-defendant] tell the district court what testimony 
either Stagno or Fimmano would give were they to be provided with immunity. The belated affidavit of [the 
co-defendant’s] counsel, asserting that Fimmano would have exculpated [the co-defendant] had Fimmano been 
given immunity and testified, cannot cure the fact that no such representation was made to the district court at 
the hearing. Furthermore, there has never been any representation as to how Stagno’s testimony would have 
exculpated [the defendant].” Id, at  840 
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him immunity.”103 The three judges who heard Smith say nothing about the strength of the 
government’s interest in denying witness use immunity; they argue that it fails the Smith test 
for two other reasons.  
This suggests that the judge who wrote the opinion in Smith, and the two judges who 
heard the case with him, did not believe that, in Lowell, there was no strong governmental 
interest. To fail the test, only one condition of the five-part test need not obtain. In Lowell, 
the minority mentions two conditions that fail even though one alone would have been 
sufficient. If the minority had believed that the petitioner’s due process claim failed because 
there was a strong governmental interest against granting immunity, presumably they would 
have mentioned it. This is not dispositive, however, because while the minority does not 
include the existence of a strong governmental interest, neither do they state explicitly that 
the majority has got things wrong on this count. But, all of the Smith judges fail to mention 
the existence of a strong governmental interest in their (minority) reasoning to withhold 
immunity. This provides a reason to believe that subsequent courts have imposed too high a 
burden for a defendant to meet the Smith test.   
 In applying the no countervailing strong interests test, the courts have held that the 
prosecutor’s possible future desire to prosecute the witness is a strong governmental interest, 
such that it countervails against a grant of immunity.104 But, there is reason to put pressure 
on the claim that the Smith test is not satisfied when the government might prosecute the 
witness for whom use immunity is sought.  
                                                
103 Id, at 845.  
104 Assuming that all strong governmental interests countervail against grants of immunity. 
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 Quinn treats Smith’s five-part test as a test for a due process violation when the 
prosecutor has refused to request witness immunity for the defense and where there is no 
prosecutorial misconduct. The question is then, what counts as a strong governmental interest 
not to grant immunity? As the courts have interpreted the five-part test, it is not necessary 
that the strong interest outweigh the claim for defense witness immunity, but merely count 
against it in a strong way.105 That is, the governmental interest need not be weightier than the 
reasons for granting immunity, but they must be weighty.  
 In all cases of granting immunity, whether for the defense or the prosecution, the 
cost is the same: a guilty party is less likely to be convicted of his crime. The relevant inquiry 
for the prosecutor, in determining whether to seek immunity for his own witness, is whether 
there are sufficient reasons for society to bear the cost. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 allows a prosecutor 
to seek witness use immunity only when the testimony “may be necessary to the public 
                                                
105 One reason the court might have thought that the prosecutor’s possible future interest in prosecuting the 
witness is sufficient for countervailing against a grant of immunity” is from a particular use of the word 
“countervail.” If all “countervail” means is to weigh against, then any reason, even the smallest reason, would 
“countervail.” On this interpretation of “countervail,” then, it makes sense that the court in Smith included the 
word “strong.” The Smith court, in interpreting “countervail” to mean “weigh against” did not want just any 
interest to be sufficient for the due process claim to be without merit. But, there might be a better way to 
understand “countervail.” According to the leading legal dictionary available to the court in Smith, “countervail” 
means “1. to counterbalance; 2. to avail against with equal force or virtue; 3. to compensate for, or serve as an 
equivalent or substitute for.” Black’s Law Dictionary. West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, 1979, at 508. The most 
recent Black’s has omitted the entry for “countervailing.” It does, however, include entries for “countervailing 
duty”: “A tax imposed on manufacturers of imported goods to protect domestic industry by offsetting 
subsidies given by foreign governments to those manufacturers.” It defines “Offset” as “To balance or 
calculate against; to compensate for, the gains offset the loss[.]” It defines “Balance” as “To equalize in 
number, force, or effect; to bring into proportion[.]” Garner, Bryan. Black’s Law Dictionary. West Publishing 
Co.: St. Paul, 2009, at 581, 1195, 163, respectively. The most recent Oxford English Dictionary defines 
“countervail” similarly: “To be of equal force or weight on the contrary side; to avail against…” J. A. Simpson 
& E.S.C. Weiner. The Oxford English Dictionary. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989. [1039] Indeed, in all versions of 
the definition in the OED, the requirement is that the force be equal, and not merely present, in order to 
countervail.  
 The government’s potential interest in prosecuting the witness surely is an interest. It surely weighs 
against a grant of immunity. But, it seems if one goes by the leading lay and legal dictionaries, in order for 
something to countervail it must be of equal weight and not merely some weight.  
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interest.” The United States Attorneys’ Manual, published by the Justice Department, is not 
instructive in its evaluation of decisions to offer immunity to the defense’s witness.  
“As a matter of policy, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 will not be used to compel the 
production of testimony or other information on behalf of a defendant 
except in extraordinary circumstances where the defendant plainly would be 
deprived of a fair trial without such testimony or other information.”106 
If one turns to the Manual to determine under what conditions a prosecutor must 
seek defense witness immunity in order not to cause a due process violation, one learns little 
with the instruction that a prosecutor should do this when to do otherwise would be a due process 
violation.  
After exhausting all other available options, the U.S. Attorney may request witness 
use immunity for his own witness but must determine whether doing so is necessary to the 
public interest, as required by statute. The Manual does provides guidelines for U.S. 
Attorneys confronted with a recalcitrant witness.  
The prosecutor should consider, among other reasons: 
1. “[t]he importance of the investigation or prosecution to an effective program of law 
enforcement’” 
2. “[t]he value of the person’s cooperation to the investigation or prosecution[.]”107  
If the witness’ testimony would not contribute much to the prosecution, then the 
government lacks sufficient reason to offer immunity at the cost of the ability to easily 
prosecute the witness in the future. If the person to be immunized could be prosecuted for a 
                                                
106 United States Attorneys' Manual. 
<http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/index.html>  
9-23.214. 
107 Id, at 9-27.620. This language is nearly identical to that in 9-23.210. There, the first consideration is 
construed as “The importance of the investigation or prosecution to effective enforcement of the criminal 
laws.” 
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more serious crime than the person against whom he would testify, the government may lack 
sufficient reason to offer immunity to the defendant.  
In some cases, it might be that the government has a strong interest against granting 
immunity, but that this interest, though strong, is outweighed by considerations in favor of 
granting immunity. While the prosecutor must conduct a balancing test in order to 
determine whether granting use immunity is necessary to the public interest, the court will 
not do such a balancing test for defense witness immunity. But, to determine a due process 
violation it is necessary to determine whether the government has a strong interest in not 
granting immunity. 
The strength of an interest against doing something is relative to the costs and 
benefits associated with the result of doing that thing. Strength is context dependent.108 In 
this case, while the costs are fixed, the benefits are not. Imagine that a prosecutor is trying 
two cases, one against a mob boss, Boss, and one against a mob underling, Underling. In 
each case, he has a different witness whom he would like to present inculpatory testimony 
against the defendant, at trial: Witness A and Witness B. Witness A and Witness B have both 
been indicted for the same crime, and both have claimed the right against self-incrimination 
and have refused to testify. In each case, the prosecutor is considering requesting use 
immunity for the witness. In each case, the cost of granting immunity is the same, as far as 
the public interest is concerned. In each case, the public has an interest in the state 
prosecuting criminals, and in each case a criminal would be much less likely to be prosecuted 
                                                
108 For example, one might say that an ant is strong, compared to other insects, but it is not strong compared 
to humans.   
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successfully if granted use immunity. Thus, in each case there is a governmental interest 
against a grant of immunity.  
But, even thought the cost of granting each of the witnesses immunity is the same, the 
prosecutor’s interest in not granting them immunity is not. He has a stronger interest in not 
granting immunity to Witness B, to testify against Underling, than he does in not granting 
immunity to Witness A, to testify against Boss. The magnitude of the interest in not doing 
two actions, where the cost is fixed, varies according to the benefit. The prosecutor has a 
less strong interest in not granting immunity to Witness A because the benefit of prosecuting 
Boss is so high. The enormous benefit of a successful prosecution of Boss dwarfs the 
interest in not granting immunity to Witness A. The minor benefit of a successful 
prosecution of Underling does not dwarf the interest in not granting immunity to Witness B, 
even if it still outweighs it. Thus, while there might be a strong governmental interest in not 
prosecuting Witness B, there is not a strong governmental interest in not prosecuting Witness 
A. 
Where the cost of doing two different actions is fixed, in order for the government’s 
interest against doing those two things to be different the benefits of doing each must be 
different. This is what happens in the case of granting use immunity to witnesses for the 
defense.  
Because the benefits of granting a defense’s witness use immunity are much higher 
than the benefits of granting a Government’s witness use immunity, what counts as a strong 
governmental interest against granting a prosecutor’s witness immunity does not count as a 
strong governmental interest against granting a defense witness immunity.  
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When the Government considers granting use immunity to its own witness, it 
sacrifices the ability to convict the witness in exchange for (what it hopes) is the ability to 
convict the defendant. If their crimes are equal, and the Government thinks its chance of 
convicting either party is the same, then it seems like the cost is roughly the same as the 
benefit. But, when the Government considers granting use immunity to the defendant’s 
witness at the sacrifice of the ability to convict the witness in a future prosecution, all else 
equal, the benefit is far greater than the cost. The Government’s interest in not granting a 
defense witness immunity is far less strong than its interest in not granting its own witness 
immunity.  
Attorneys regularly remark, a la Blackstone, that it is better to let ten guilty men go 
free than to convict one innocent man. The criminal standard of proof is evidence of the 
United State’s fidelity to the Blackstone ratio. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
creates a high false negative error rate. But, this is what the Government has deemed an 
appropriate distribution of error. So, a judge does not need to look far, and does not need to 
step outside the boundary of the judiciary to determine that the Government’s interest in 
convicting a guilty man is substantially smaller—perhaps by an order of magnitude, than its 
interest in exonerating an innocent man.  
In order to determine whether there is a strong governmental interest, which 
countervails against a grant of immunity, the court needs to consider the context of the 
Government’s interest. If the potential benefit of a Government’s decision to immunize a 
witness is that a criminal will be convicted, then the cost of granting immunity to the witness 
might be low and still count as serving a strong governmental interest not to grant immunity, 
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because the benefit is also relatively low. But, if the potential benefit of a Government’s 
decision to immunize a witness is that a defendant’s due process right to put forward an 
effective defense is realized, then the cost of granting immunity to the witness must be very 
high in order to count as serving a strong governmental interest against granting immunity.  
There is another reason to think that the benefit of granting use immunity to a 
defense witness is much higher than it is to granting it to a Government witness. Even if the 
benefits of a true conviction and a true acquittal were the same (which they are not), because 
of the high standard of proof in criminal trials the testimony of the Government’s witnesses 
is less weighty than the defense’s witnesses, all else equal. In Steele, the court explains that 
merely relevant evidence does not suffice for clearly exculpatory evidence. “‘Relevant 
evidence,’” it writes, is “‘evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.’”109 
But, the defendant need only convince the trier of fact that there is a reasonable 
doubt that he committed the crime. Two witnesses giving testimony of the same probative 
value, one as a defense witness and one as the Government witness, on average, will have 
much different effects on the outcome of the trial. A defense witness’ testimony that makes 
the jury just slightly less confident will require acquittal, whereas a Government witness’ 
testimony that makes the jury slightly more confident will often not result in a conviction. 
For this reason as well, the benefit of granting the defense witness use immunity, all else 
equal, is higher than the benefit of granting the Government’s witness use immunity, and 
                                                
109 Steele, supra note 82, at 808, citing the Fed.R.Evid. at 401 
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thus the cost associated with granting immunity must be much higher in order for the 























 The Third Circuit has made a number of unwarranted assumptions. It has taken a 
test originally intended to determine whether a remedy for a due process violation is 
appropriate and used it to determine whether the due process violation has occurred. It has 
assumed that all strong governmental interests in fact countervail against grants of immunity. 
In applying the Smith test, the court has imposed too high a showing for “clearly 
exculpatory” evidence and too high a standard for a governmental interest to suffice as 
“strong.” In order to ensure that the defendant’s due process right to put forward an 
effective defense, as established in Brady, Roviaro, Chambers, and other cases, is secured, the 
Third Circuit ought to revisit its analysis of the Smith test. It is necessary to the public 
interest that a defendant is able to present an effective defense. This is a strong governmental 
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